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1 Introduction
The present paper examines the role of the multinational development banks (MDBs) in
private sector financing with a particular focus on the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, which was established in 1956
to provide equity and loan finance to the private sector. Regional multilateral
development banks too have units that perform a similar role. It is notable that hitherto a
discussion of the activities and portfolios of these multilateral development banks in
private sector financing has been mainly confined to their respective annual reports.
Few or no concerted efforts (outside the banks’ annual reports) have been reported in
the literature on this issue, despite the growing need for it to be critically analysed.
Along these lines the aim of the present paper is to bring to focus, in an analytical
manner, the past activities and operations as well as problems and prospects of the IFC.
IFC’s portfolio, sectoral and regional allocation of its lending and equity finance, etc.
will also be highlighted (section 2). Simple econometric analysis will also be
undertaken to test a number of hypotheses regarding IFC finance such as whether IFC’s
financing is additional or substitute to private capital flows as well as the relationship
between IFC finance and growth in IFC finance-recipient countries and regions
(section 3). Finally, areas which need reforms will also be discussed, particularly in the
light of recommendations (which were finally rejected by the US Treasury) included in
the report by the US Congress’ International Financial Institution Advisory
Committee’s Report of March 2000 (section 4).
2 IFC finance: trends, features and key issues
2.1 Origins, objectives and IFC’s role in private sector financing
IFC was founded in 1956 to act as the private arm of the World Bank with the main aim
to promote development through catalysing private sector investment in developing
countries. It is owned by 175 member-countries and shares commercial risks with
sponsors and other financial partners when they are not yet prepared to invest
independently. IFC invests in private enterprises that benefit the economy, promote a
sound environment and social well-being, and are examples of good business for other
entrepreneurs. IFC is also trying to mitigate country risk and advises governments
independently as well as private sector companies in the context of a transaction (IFC
2002a).
According to IFC:
the IFC, a part of the World Bank Group, fosters sustainable economic
growth in the developing world by financing privates sector investment,
mobilizing capital in the international financial markets, and providing
technical assistance and advice to governments and businesses (IFC
2002a).
Furthermore, ‘… IFC’s mission is to promote sustainable private sector investment in
developing countries, helping to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives’ (IFC
2001a).2
IFC acts as both a commercial and a public entity. IFC argues that it invests principally
on a commercial basis, but as a public entity does so where market failures exist,
complementing and catalyzing funding from private financial markets rather than
competing with them. IFC also acts in part on a non-commercial basis, where its
shareholders believe its experience and expertise make it the most appropriate
institution for supporting the delivery of certain public goods.
According to IFC, the Corporation’s recent role as the private sector arm of the World
Bank Group is characterized by (IFC 2002b):
−   A primary focus on frontier markets. This means a focus on countries where there
is little or no foreign capital flow, especially debt capital, or areas and sectors
within a country where there is very limited capital availability. IFC argues that it
tries to act as a catalyst to help companies implement investment plans and to
provide the risk mitigation that enables investors to proceed with plans they
otherwise would not implement, given perceived risks. At the same time, the
relative scarcity of good investment opportunities in many frontier markets
requires IFC to complement its investment work with extensive technical
assistance, and to transfer know-how and best practices from more developed
areas. IFC also supports governments’ efforts to develop SMEs, improve the
investment climate, and undertake privatizations.
−   A counter-cyclical role in non-frontier markets, when their access to alternative
sources of financing dries up. Capital flows to emerging markets are expected to
remain depressed and volatile for the foreseeable future. Private sector companies
in many countries, even those with good access to financing in the mid-1990s, may
have only very limited or sporadic access to private financing over the medium
term. In view of the above, IFC can play an important counter-cyclical role in
those countries. Such a role will be particularly important in countries—many of
them middle-income—which depend on cross-border flows to finance their
investment needs.
−   Provision of support to international companies increasingly reluctant to invest in
developing countries (e.g., infrastructure).
−   Increasing emphasis on high-impact sectors. IFC currently seeks to emphasize
sectors that contribute disproportionately to development, where ‘spill-over’
effects in addition to the economically productive use of capital are significant.
These have included domestic financial markets, infrastructure, information and
communications technology (ICT), and social sectors.
−   An increasingly important role in providing know-how to domestic companies in
developing countries for a full range of technical knowledge (for example, on
financial issues, accountancy, marketing and technology), and to both domestic
and international companies in areas related to sustainable development (corporate
governance, environmental management and local community development), and
can help companies compete effectively in world markets. International companies
also seek IFC’s know-how and experience in frontier markets. IFC’s know-how
services are often ‘bundled’ with its investments, where they can be an important
part of strengthening a project’s long-term viability.3
2.2 IFC’s portfolio
Recent years have witnessed an expansion of IFC’s portfolio and activities (see
Table 1). Three hundred and four projects in total were approved in the 1998 fiscal year.
Since then, mainly due to the impact of the Asian financial crisis, the number of
approved projects declined to 240 projects in the fiscal year 2001. Compared to
previous years, total financing over the period 1997-2001 increased substantially to
reach almost US$7 billion in 1997, and then to follow a declining trend during the
period 1998-2001. Total committed portfolio reached almost US$22 billion in 2001 and
the number of firms involved in IFC’s financing activities was 1,378 the same year.
Table 1
IFC operations and resources, 1997-2001
(millions of US$)
OPERATIONS FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001
Investment commitments
Number of projects (a – – 228 210 205
Total commitments signed (b 5,558 5,138 3,688 3,909 3,931
For IFC’s own account (b 2,402 2,699 2,890 2,379 2,732
Held for others 3,156 2,439 798 1,530 1,199
Investment approvals
Number of projects 276 304 255 259 240
Total financing approved (c 6,722 5,905 5,280 5,846 5,357
For IFC’s own account (c 3,317 3,412 3,505 3,505 3,742
Held for others 3,405 2,493 1,775 2,341 1,615
Total project costs 17,945 15,726 15,578 21,136 16,427
Investment disbursements
Total financing disbursed 5,110 4,291 3,296 3,307 2,370
For IFC’s own account 2,003 2,054 2,102 2,210 1,535
Held for others 3,107 2,237 1,194 1,097 835
Committed portfolio (d
Number of firms 1,046 1,138 1,280 1,333 1,378
Total committed portfolio (b 18,992 20,608 21,685 22,168 21,851
For IFC’s own account (b 10,512 11,448 13,364 13,962 14,321
Held for others 8,471 9,160 8,321 8,206 7,530
RESOURCES AND INCOME (millions of US$)
Capitalization
Borrowings 10,123 11,162 12,429 14,919 15,457
Paid-in capital 2,229 2,337 2,350 2,358 2,360
Retained earnings 2,503 2,749 2,998 3,378 3,723
Operating income 432 212 249 380 241
Net income 432 246 249 380 345
Notes: Certain prior period amounts have been reclassified to conform to current period presentation;
(a Includes first commitment to projects in the fiscal year. Projects involving financing to more
than one company are counted as one commitment. Figures maintained for commitments
prior to FY99 do not compare;
(b Includes loan guarantees and risk management products for FY 1999-01;
(c Includes loan guarantees and risk management products for FY 1997-01;
(d Total committed portfolio and held for others include securitized loans.
Source: IFC (2001a).4
2.3 Sectoral allocation of IFC projects and activities
IFC’s projects range across many sectors: financial services, infrastructure (including
communications technologies, power, water and sewerage, and transportation), oil, gas
and mining, food and agribusiness, social services (including private health care and
education), chemicals and petrochemicals, and hotels and tourism.1
The financial sector attracted about 40 per cent of IFC commitments on average during
the period 1999-2001 followed by infrastructure (13 per cent on average), transport and
other infrastructure (7.5 per cent), power sector (6 per cent), information
communication technologies (5.5 per cent) and social sectors (2 per cent). The above
priority sectors attracted almost 70 per cent of IFC’s commitments in the fiscal year
2001 (see Table 2).
Recent years have also witnessed a growing emphasis on behalf of IFC on SMEs and
SME-related projects. Indeed, as Table 2 seems to suggest, IFC investment
commitments associated with SME-related projects increased significantly during the
period 1999-2001 from US$1.5 billion in 1999 to almost US$2 billion in 2001 with the
share of the relevant sector increasing to almost 20 per cent in 2001 compared to 13 per
cent in 1999.2
 Table 2
IFC investment commitments by sector
Fiscal year 1999 Fiscal year 2000 Fiscal year 2001
US$ million % US$ million % US$ million %
Financial sector 1,170 40.5 747 31.5 1,154 42.6
Infrastructure (excl. ICT) 244 8.5 471 19.8 334 12.3
Power sector 82 2.9 237 9.9 141 5.2
Transport & other infrastructure 162 5.6 234 9.9 193 7.1
Information communication technologies 51 1.8 88 3.7 294 10.8
Social sectors 37 1.3 24 1.0 106 3.9
Total priority sectors 1,502 52.0 1,330 56.0 1,888 69.6
SME-related projects 370 12.8 349 14.7 521 19.2
Source:  IFC (2002b).
                                                
1 IFC specifies certain criteria for a project to be financed by IFC. The project must be (i) technically
and financially viable, (ii) economically competitive, (iii) beneficial to the local population and
(iv) environmentally and socially sound.
2 IFC’s support for the SME sector is increasingly focused on: (i) working through and with local
financial intermediaries to provide access to financing for smaller companies; (ii) creating new local
financial intermediaries such as microfinance institutions, venture capital funds, leasing companies
and others; (iii) providing funding from the SME capacity building facility to scale up global best
practice institutions; and (iv) providing technical assistance and advisory support through project
development facilities, which assist SMEs by developing local SME service providers, preparing
project feasibility studies, accessing financing, and obtaining a broad range of management and
technical assistance including post-financing. This approach has replaced that of direct financing,
which in IFC’s experience has proven an expensive and ineffective way to reach smaller companies.5
2.4 Regional allocation of IFC lending
Turning to the regional allocation of IFC investment commitments, both the Latin
America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa regions attracted half
of IFC’s commitments in 2001 (26 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively) followed by
the Asia and the Pacific region (20 per cent), Sub-Saharan Africa (16 per cent) and
Europe and Central Asia (13 per cent) (see Table 3).
In the case of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, IFC’s focus in 2000-01 was mostly on the
financial sector, infrastructure projects, SMEs and tourism businesses with a total
committed portfolio above US$1.8 billion in 2001 as compared to US$1.5 billion in the
previous year.3
Asia and the Pacific attracted more than US$6.5 billion in 2000-01, with most of the
IFC commitments directed to the financial sector and SMEs (sectors particularly
affected by the recent financial crisis in the region). A number of projects were
approved in the above sectors for China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and South
Korea among others. At the same time, IFC’s commitments in South Asia increased
substantially in 2001 with a particular emphasis on new products to new clients in new
sectors.4
In Europe and Central Asia, IFC’s committed portfolio exceeded US$3.6 billion in 2000
to decline slightly to US$3.3 billion in 2001. Growing emphasis was given to sectors
and countries in the region with the most acute need to advance the pace of private
sector development.5
Turning to the Latin America region—the main recipient of IFC’s investment
commitments in recent years—IFC’s portfolio ranged between US$8.5 billion and
US$9 billion in the 2000-01 period. Priority was given to those businesses where private
sector participation can provide a visible impact on living standards such as housing
finance, health, education and infrastructure.6
Finally, in the case of the Middle East and North Africa region (the other major
recipient of IFC’s financing in recent years), IFC invested mainly in infrastructure
(Egypt, Morocco), small information technology companies (Egypt), large capital
market investments (Syria) as well as institution-building investments in the financial
sector (Algeria). IFC committed almost US$1 billion in 18 investments in the 2001
                                                
3 Specific projects included an eco-tourism project in Tanzania, expanding telephone service in Ghana,
agreement to finance the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project, financing 12 hotel projects in the region
etc.
4 Examples include a student loan programme with NIIT Ltd., a leading IT company in India,
supporting a trade enhancement facility in Bangladesh, supporting microfinance institutions in India
etc.
5 Examples of recent IFC projects in the above region include the strengthening of capacity building in
Tajikistan, revitalizing a neglected copper firm in Bulgaria, supporting pharmaceutical companies in
Croatia and financing (on a joint basis with the government of Finland) sustainable forest management
practices in north-west Russia, among others.
6 Specific projects included the financing of education projects in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Peru and
Uruguay, improving conditions for mortgage borrowers and lenders in Mexico and Peru, supporting
microfinance institutions in Mexico, etc.6
fiscal year. It is notable that, for IFC, this was a record level of loan syndications for the
region, partly due to the commitment of a number of sizeable infrastructure investments.
The total committed portfolio reached US$1.6 billion in 2001.
Table 3
IFC commitments by region ($millions)
$ millions %
Sub-Saharan Africa 642 16
Asia and the Pacific 784 20
Europe and Central Asia 510 13
Latin America and the Caribbean 1,017 26




2.5 Discussion of IFC’s products and services
IFC has a variety of products and services. They include the following:
−   Equity and quasi-equity: IFC buys shares in project companies, other project
entities, financial institutions, and portfolio or private equity funds. It generally
subscribes to between 5 and 20 percent of a project’s equity. It will not normally
hold more than a 35 percent stake and is never the single largest shareholder in a
project. Through quasi-equity instruments, IFC invests through products that have
both debt and equity characteristics.
−   Loan and intermediary services: IFC finances projects and companies through A-
loans, which are for IFC’s own account. IFC does not accept government
guarantees. Maturities of A-loans generally range between 7 and 12 years at
origination, but some loans have been extended to as long as 20 years. Finally, IFC
makes loans to intermediary banks, leasing companies, and other financial
institutions through credit lines that result in further on-lending. These credit lines
are often targeted at small businesses.
−   Syndicated loans, or B-loans: IFC broadens its impact by mobilizing loans from
other financial institutions that are willing to lend to projects only with IFC’s
participation. Along these lines, syndicated loans, or B-loans, are an important part
of IFC’s finance products. Through this mechanism, financial institutions share
fully in the commercial credit risk of projects while IFC remains the lender of
record.
−   Guarantees and risk management: Loan and bond guarantees and standby
financing allow IFC’s clients to use IFC’s credit to help them secure financing
from international capital markets. IFC offers credit enhancement structures for
debt instruments. IFC’s risk management services enable clients to access
derivatives markets through IFC as an intermediary.7
−   Advisory services: IFC’s advisory services are designed to improve the investment
climate in member countries and the business practices of companies in which IFC
invests. They play an increasingly important role in the way IFC approaches its
investment activities. IFC undertakes a wide array of financial market advisory
assignments, specializing in securities markets and banking and credit institutions.
Another newly created and jointly managed unit, the Small and Medium Enterprise
Department, focuses on business environment issues, capacity building, and the
development of innovative financing techniques.
−   Technical assistance: Technical assistance further complements IFC’s investment
activities by providing advice and training to governments and private companies.
Cumulative contributions to IFC-managed technical assistance programmes
reached US$582 million in 2001, compared with a cumulative total of US$525
million at the end of 2000 (fiscal years). 71 per cent of the above technical
assistance programmes were supported by donor countries, about 20 per cent by
the World Bank Group and 10 per cent by donor institutions (IFC 2001a).
2.6 Evaluating IFC’s effectiveness
Recently IFC published the cumulative findings from four years of evaluating IFC’s
investments. It draws from evaluations of 176 randomly-selected IFC operations that
were approved in 1991-94 and evaluated in 1996-99. The results of the evaluation
process became available from the Annual Review of IFC’s Evaluation Findings (2001).
The main findings seem to suggest that:
−   IFC’s operations have generated substantially greater benefits for others—
customers, employees, suppliers and taxpayers—than they have for the owners and
financiers of the projects;
−   IFC’s effectiveness—how well IFC does its job throughout the project cycle—is
strongly associated with positive outcomes. When IFC’s effectiveness was
consistently good, it achieved good development results in 91 per cent of cases,
and good development and investment results in over two-thirds of cases.
−   Among IFC’s strategically important sectors, infrastructure projects yielded
significantly better than average development results. Similarly, investments in
targeted high-risk countries performed better developmentally. This finding,
according to IFC, may not hold for the future, as fewer countries currently are
designated high-risk, and they may be more challenging environments in which to
work.
Obviously, the above relatively satisfactory findings need to be assessed on the basis of
the evaluation criteria that IFC is employing to evaluate its activities. In what follows
we discuss the IFC’s evaluation approach in detail as well as further findings related to
specific performance indicators.
Each year IFC evaluates a random sample of investments that have reached early
operating maturity (typically five years following approval by which time the projects
have been established and built up a track record of operating performance). Within
statistical limits the sample is representative of each year’s entire approvals. First, self-8
evaluations of the investments in the sample are undertaken by IFC’s investment
department staff. They complete the research and analysis necessary to rate each
investment on 11 indicators. Using corporate guidelines, they rate each indicator on a
four-point scale: unsatisfactory, partly unsatisfactory, satisfactory, and excellent. Next,
the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) conducts independent research, verifies each
rating to ensure that evaluation standards are applied consistently throughout IFC, then
synthesizes its findings in each year’s annual review. The Annual Review 2000 is based
on evaluations conducted during 1996-99 of investments approved during 1991-94. It
also draws on findings from previous annual reviews as well as four years of OEG
evaluation research.
Each of the 11 performance indicators used in IFC’s evaluation process relates to one of
three outcome ratings:
−   Development outcome: a project’s contribution to a country’s economic
development and improved living standards;
−   Investment outcome: an investment’s contribution to IFC’s profitability; and
−   IFC’s effectiveness: how well IFC does its job throughout the project cycle.
IFC’s effectiveness is evaluated on the basis of achieving good development and
investment outcomes i.e. ‘win-win’ outcomes. ‘Win-win’ operations are the ones that
simultaneously foster development and are sufficiently profitable relative to their risk to
contribute to IFC’s own sustainability for supporting development.
Two-thirds of the evaluated operations had successful development outcomes.
Development outcome ratings are a judgmental synthesis of six indicators.
The following findings are reported from IFC’s Operations Evaluation Group, from
highest- to lowest-rated indicator:
−   Living standards: IFC’s operations have generated substantially greater benefits
for others—customers, employees, suppliers, and taxpayers—than they have for
the projects’ owners and financiers. This outcome is measured by the difference in
projects’ economic (social) and financial (private) rates of return. For 102
investments in which analysis was possible, OEG estimated that they generated net
present values of approximately US$1.4-1.6 billion in direct net benefits in
developing countries, US$0.9 billion more than that received by the owners and
financiers.7
−   Private sector development: Three-quarters of IFC’s projects have contributed to
the development of local private sectors through linkages supporting other private
enterprises, demonstration effects, privatizations, or regulatory changes.
                                                
7 For example, a mine in an isolated area has considerably improved the standard of living for 3,000
local inhabitants by providing well-paid jobs, housing, health care, schooling, better communications
and amenities.9
−   Environmental impact: Two-thirds of operations, including many whose
profitability for their owners fell short, met IFC’s high standards for environmental
sustainability.8
−   Growth of the economy: About two-thirds of evaluated projects yielded tangible
benefits to the economy. For example, a project to modernize the production
facilities of a beverage company allowed it to respond efficiently to an unforeseen
increase in consumer demand and at the same time realize economies of scale, as
labour productivity increased.
−   Project business success: This indicator, reflecting whether a company earned an
attractive profit on its investment, was the lowest-rated. When a project's financial
returns are less than the cost of capital, the business success is rated less than
satisfactory. This was the rating for about half of the projects.9
−   Company business success:  Notwithstanding the success or otherwise of their
projects, a higher proportion of companies, particularly those that were established
enterprises with proven expertise, remained clearly viable despite concerns.
2.7 Results versus IFC’s strategic objectives and priorities
As already mentioned, IFC’s strategy in recent years focuses on (i) high-risk or low-
income countries and ‘frontier’ regions or sectors within countries; and (ii) targeted
sectors (mainly financial markets and infrastructure). More precisely:
−   In targeted sectors, the evaluation results were mixed. Infrastructure projects
performed better, but some credit lines to financial institutions lacked a clear IFC
role or contribution to needed capacity-building.
−   In low-income countries, there was no discernible difference in performance of
IFC’s operations other than on average poorer environmental impacts.
−   Operations in countries that were regarded by institutional investors as high-risk at
the time of approval (i.e. 1991-94) had a significantly higher proportion of ‘win-
win’ outcomes than projects in other countries.10
                                                
8 For example, an IFC investment in an expansion project helped reduce effluent and air emissions from
a wood pulp and paper company’s existing operations. Moreover, bio-mass from the plant was used as
a coal replacement at an adjacent power station.
9 This finding is fully consistent with the results of a recent survey, conducted by an independent
consulting firm, of multinational companies operating in the same regions as IFC. Based on ratings
standards that mirror those IFC uses, the firm judged the companies’ projects as financially successful
in 44 per cent to 74 per cent of cases, depending on the region. IFC achieved project business success
rates of between 35 per cent and 63 per cent across these same regions, but in a higher-risk mix of
countries.
10 Furthermore, the OEG looked at all of IFC’s equity investments approved between 1985 and 1995 and
found that IFC had significantly better returns in countries that were high-risk at the time of
investment approval.10
Needless to say, the above evaluation results are not based on an independent external
evaluation and, hence, the findings should be accepted with caution and the reservation
that any other internal assessment deserves.
2.8 The profitability issue
A key issue for IFC seems to be related to the improvement of its profitability. It has
been correctly argued that the impact of the global slowdown and the crisis in Argentina
have put pressure on IFC’s profitability and have highlighted the need to focus on
improving the IFC’s profitability as a top priority. In view of the above, IFC goes
further by arguing that it is rather important to ensure that IFC’s partners experience
their investments as profitable opportunities, and that IFC continues to provide a
positive signal to other investors that good business can be done in developing
countries, in particular when their apprehension about investing in emerging markets
has increased.
Two further arguments have been put forward by IFC recently on the profitability issue:
first, replicability, i.e. if the projects do not earn a return corresponding to what private
investors can earn on other investments, IFC projects will not be replicated and nothing
sustainable will have been created, and second, crowding out, i.e. if IFC accepts, for
otherwise viable projects, a lower return for itself, the IFC would be crowding out the
private financial market and hinder its development (Lysy 2001).11
The OEG also stresses the importance of profitability for IFC on the basis that there is a
close correlation between projects’ business success and their development outcomes,
and better quality investments should translate into a stronger development impact for
IFC. The OEG argues that improving profitability will require in particular continued
efforts to work out problem investments, as well as to ensure that good quality new
investments are booked by IFC, and that improvements in efficiency continue to be
sought. In the same vein, it has been argued that if IFC is not profitable, its financial
capacity could be eroded, and a negative signal would be sent about good business to be
done in developing countries (IFC 2002b).12 In view of the above arguments, the
OEG’s annual review has recently recommended that the current top priority for IFC is
strengthening profitability.
                                                
11 It is notable that issues of profitability are currently in the heart of the agenda for IFC in view of the
fact that the average overall return on equity (ROE) that IFC has earned over the period 1997-2001
(fiscal years) was 6.4 per cent , well below the ROE of US investment banks/security houses (11.2 per
cent) and of most European banks (8.2 per cent) (Lysy 2001).
12 There is also a need for some clarification with regard to IFC’s profitability. IFC’s consolidated
income includes expenditures on activities undertaken in line with IFC’s developmental mandate, but
without commercial compensation. Examples include IFC’s work in capacity-building for SMEs,
participation in World Bank Group advisory efforts to improve the investment climate, management
and delivery of technical assistance (including overseeing technical assistance activities funded by
donor trust funds), and for economic and environmental work above and beyond what would be
required purely for risk management (IFC 2002b).11
3 Evaluating IFC finance: what the data really tell us
In this section we evaluate IFC’s private finance by using data from a number of
sources regarding its private capital flows, GDP growth rates and per capita income in
recipient countries. We use two types of empirical analysis. First, we use simple
correlation analysis among a number of crucial variables, namely IFC finance and other
private capital flows, as well as IFC finance and GDP per capita in recipient countries.
The purpose of this simple, albeit important, statistical analysis is to test IFC’s own
conclusions and statements regarding the features as well as impact of IFC capital on its
recipients (see previous section). Second, since correlation analysis is indicative only of
the degree of correlation among the variables in question, we also conduct Granger-
causality type tests within a panel of 59 recipients of IFC capital flows for which data
are available over the period 1980-2000, but also by region, to explore the direction of
causation between the economic relationships under investigation.
3.1 A focus on frontier markets?
The first assumption we tried to test is related to the IFC’s hypothesized focus on
frontier markets (see section 2). More precisely, according to IFC, a primary focus on
frontier markets means a focus on countries where there is little or no foreign capital
flow. We tried to test the above assertion by analysing data on IFC flows in order to
investigate whether there exists a negative correlation between the access of a country
or a region to capital flows (measured as total net FDI’s share in GDP) and IFC’s own
net investment in that country or region (the share of IFC finance in GDP). Data cover
the period 1980 to 2000.13 Initially we started with 126 countries, but almost half of
them were dropped from the statistical analysis due to lack of data. At the end, 59
countries representing all geographical regions (although with a different degree of
representation) remained in the final sample.
Correlation statistics regarding the relationship between total net FDI share in GDP and
the share of IFC finance in GDP are reported in the first column of Table 4. The results
concerning the above relationship are rather mixed. In 30 out of 59 countries in the
sample, a negative correlation was found between the two variables, thus confirming a
‘focus on frontier markets’. For the remaining countries in the sample (29), however, a
positive correlation seems to exist, thus not supporting the theory of a focus on markets
with little or no capital. It is also notable, that with a few exceptions (Uganda, Turkey,
Uruguay, Tunisia, Togo and Malaysia), in the majority of cases the degree of correlation
is also very low.
Does the picture change if we focus on regions instead of countries? The bottom part of
Table 4 reports correlation analysis results between the same variables but this time for
each region. A focus on countries with little or no capital is confirmed only in the case
of the East Asia and Pacific region (though with only six countries being included in the
final sample due to data problems) and Latin America (18 countries in the sample). For
the remaining four regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Middle East and North
                                                
13 The data on IFC capital flows comes from the OECD-DAC (online database). The data on FDI and
GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth are obtained from World Bank (2001).12
Africa and Europe and Central Asia) the emerging sign is positive, thus rejecting




Country FDI capital flows & IFC finance GDP per capita & IFC finance
1. China -0.271 -0.081
2. Fiji 0.255 -0.079
3. Indonesia -0.305 0.589
4. Malaysia -0.468 -0.223
5. Philippines -0.005 0.168
6. Thailand -0.131 0.076
7. Cyprus 0.072 0.320
8. Hungary -0.201 -0.418







16.Costa Rica -0.368 0.124
17.Dominican Republic -0.154 0.120
18.Ecuador -0.040 -0.004
















35.Sri Lanka -0.117 -0.168
36.Benin 0.359 0.798
37.Cameroon -0.055 -0.256
38.Congo, Rep. -0.147 0.043






                                                
14 Again, it is notable that in the case of South Asia, Europe and Central Asia and Middle East and North
Africa regions, five, three and three countries are included, respectively. The exception is














53.Sierra Leone -0.091 0.456







East Asia and Pacific -0.242 0.444
Europe and Central Asia 0.162 0.395
Latin American and Caribbean -0.165 0.354
Middle East and North Africa 0.314 -0.125
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.234 0.414
South Asia 0.181 0.496
3.2 IFC capital flows and other foreign private finance: complements
or substitutes?
A very central question in the present paper is whether IFC finance leads (and hence
encourages or catalyses) other forms of foreign private finance or merely passively
follows them. To test the above relationship we again use data on IFC capital flows to
countries/regions (the share of IFC finance in GDP) as well as data on other private
capital flows (the share of FDI from other sources in GDP) over the 1980-2000 period
for the same group of 59 countries for which data are available. We conduct Granger-
causality tests within a panel (see Attanasio et al. 2000 as well as notes to Table 5, for
further details), over the same period for our panel of 59 countries. Results are reported
in Table 5, and the emerging conclusion is that other private finances in the form of FDI
do Granger-cause IFC finance but IFC private finance does not cause other FDI flows.
We also try to explore the direction of causation between the two variables within a
panel of regions instead of countries. The results reported in Table 5 seem to suggest no
causality between the two variables, namely IFC finance and FDI flows. In view of the
disproportionate representation of countries in the five regions due to data problems,
however, we conduct the same exercise for two regions, Latin America and
Sub-Saharan Africa, for which a substantial number of countries are included in each
region (18 and 24, respectively). Granger-causality test results for Latin America
(Table 5) seem to suggest that IFC finance leads other forms of foreign private finance.14
However, the above conclusion is region specific. Indeed, our Granger causality test for




















































Notes: Standard errors are the figures reported in parentheses: * = significant at 5% significance level;
** = significant at 10% level.
Within this framework, IFC finance is deemed to have causal effect on the first-difference of FDI
if (in column 1) the reported estimate is jointly significant. Also, FDI would be deemed to have
causal effect on IFC if (in column 2), the estimate is significantly statistically. IFC is said to cause
economic growth if (in column 3) the coefficient is significant. Finally, economic growth would be
driving IFC flows if (in column 4), the coefficient of economic growth is significant.
3.3 IFC finance and growth: what causes what?
It would be of equal importance for us to know whether IFC finance leads economic
growth or passively responds to economic growth. Initially, we conducted simple
correlation analysis to shed some light on the correlation between IFC flows (the share
of IFC finance in GDP) and GDP per capita for our panel of 59 countries.16 The
correlation statistics reported in column 2 of Table 4, suggest a positive and varying
degree of correlation in 30 countries in the sample. For the other half of countries in our
sample (29), the emerging relationship, as expected, is negative with a varying degree of
correlation. Correlation analysis by region was also undertaken and the results are
reported in the bottom part of column 2 in Table 4. With the exception of the Middle
East and North Africa region, there exists a clear positive correlation between the two
variables in all regions with the degree of correlation ranging between 35 per cent (Latin
America) and 49 per cent (South Asia).
In view of the descriptive nature of the above type of analysis, however, Granger-
causality tests were also carried out to explore further the IFC finance-growth
relationship. In columns 3 and 4, first row of Table 5, we report the Granger-causality
                                                
15 However, the results should be treated with caution in view of the low significance of coefficients for
both regions.
16 The data on FDI and GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth are obtained from World Bank (2001).
GDP per capita is based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at
market prices is based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 US dollars.15
test results for our panel of 59 countries. The emerging conclusion is one-way causality,
with the direction of causation running from GDP growth to IFC finance (IFC’s finance
share in GDP) and not vice versa. The above finding is also confirmed within the
context of our panel of regions (see columns 3 and 4, second row of Table 5).
Finally, in line with our previous methodology, we tested the above relationship for the
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa regions which are better represented (18 and 24
countries, respectively) compared to the other geographical regions. Results related to
the Latin American region (columns 3 and 4, third row of Table 5) seem to suggest lack
of any causality between the two variables, however. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa
(columns 3 and 4, fourth row, Table 5), IFC finance does cause growth and not vice
versa, thus clearly indicating that causality between the two variables is region specific.
The finding for the Sub-Saharan Africa region is quite interesting though since it
indicates a positive role for IFC finance in the region and a clear potential for a much
more significant role in the future.
4 Criticism, recommendations and the way ahead
Of particular relevance to the present paper is the Meltzer Commission’s
recommendation regarding private sector financing from the MDBs, and in particular
about the future of IFC. The Meltzer Report recommends that private-sector
involvement by the development institutions should be limited to the provision of
technical assistance and the dissemination of best practice standards. Investment,
guarantees, and lending to the private sector should be halted. The Commission’s view
for IFC in particular, is that the Corporation should be merged into the World Bank (the
‘world development agency’), to more closely integrate its function into the Bank’s
activities. Equivalent changes should be made at the regional agencies. The IFC should
also become an integral part of the redefined ‘world development agency’. Its capital
base would be returned to shareholders as existing portfolios are redeemed. The U.S.
share of the IFC’s US$5.3 billion capital is US$1.3 billion (Meltzer Report 2000).
Another wave of criticism of IFC’s activities came from The 50 Years is Enough!
campaign at the spring meetings of the World Bank and IMF in April 2000. The
campaign urged the abolition of the Corporation, charging that:
They pay almost no attention to who actually benefits from the profits
that they claim to generate. They support Domino’s Pizza in South
Africa and cable television in Brazil. They invest in breweries in
Romania, Russia, Tanzania and the Czech Republic, expensive private
schools in Pakistan and Uganda, and luxury hotels in Egypt, the
Maldives, Vanuatu, Costa Rica and Mexico.
The IFC’s reaction, through its IFC’s NGO relations team, to the above was that:
IFC, through advice and direct investments, seeks to reduce poverty by
helping direct private resources toward activities that benefit the poor by
growing businesses that earn their way and empower and employ people.
It said that the IFC plans further work on promoting environmental,
social and corporate governance standards.16
Alex Wilks of the Bretton Woods Project argues that:
... despite various strategy and policy restatements over the years the IFC
still appears to operate without any clear methodology for estimating or
evaluating development impacts. Moreover, the IFC has no mechanism
in its project cycle to articulate the intended development impact of a
given project. Without such a mechanism, the IFC is unable to factor
development effectiveness into either project design or implementation.
Thus, on the evidence available outside the institution it is hard to
conclude that it has a clear approach to selecting projects that will
maximize benefits for poor people and the environment (Wilks 2000).
Some observers think that closer cooperation between IFC and the World Bank in
drawing up country assistance strategies, designing sector strategies, and crafting the
private sector development strategy may help the IFC to support sectors and initiatives
that are most appropriate for the poorest. This is basically the argument behind the
recommendation of the Meltzer Commission for IFC. Others fear that the Bank and IFC
together will persuade governments to privatize strategic sectors, regardless of whether
this is the best option for the poorest. There is also concern about conflicts of interest.
Where the IFC has merged departments with those in the World Bank, the same group
of people will be advising governments on privatization and regulation strategies as well
as discussing private sector investment plans in the same sector (Wilks 2000).
On the basis of the detailed discussion of IFC’s activities, portfolio, evaluation
procedures and strategic priorities, as well as our econometric analysis in section 3, our
view is that the above criticism of IFC’s investment activities is devoid of sound
arguments for IFC’s work. Furthermore, Meltzer Report conclusions about IFC are not
based on an in-depth discussion of IFC activities, contrary to what is the case in the
Report regarding the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and the BIS.
The IFC has taken a number of efforts since 1998 to address many of the issues of
particular importance for the institution. For example, sustainability has recently
emerged as a key priority for IFC, and an increasingly important way in which IFC can
support member countries’ sustainable development efforts and add value to clients.
Examples include concentrated efforts to ensure that large projects are no longer carried
out on an ‘enclave’ model, but are closely ‘linked’ to the local economy: this, according
to IFC, broadens the benefits of these investments, and at the same time reduces risks
for investors. IFC further argues that IFC’s ability to help firms in the management of
environmental, social and governance risks as well as responding to demands for IFC’s
expertise in local capacity building and extending benefits to local communities,
increasingly differentiate the IFC from other lenders. Its expertise in these areas enables
it to take on large, risky projects which others avoid (IFC 2002b).
Furthermore, on the basis of the evaluation findings regarding IFC investment activities
(see section 2), the OEG of IFC recommends that it should:
−   Enhance measurement of its performance against its mission by introducing a
system that tracks the development of its portfolio and investment outcomes and
IFC’s operational effectiveness. As it relates to development outcome measures,
this system’s measures and IFC’s evaluation methodology should be closely
aligned;17
−   Pursue a corporate objective that focuses on achieving successful investment
outcomes and development outcomes. To this end, strategies and strategy-linked
budget allocations should consider investment and development results patterns by
sector and country risk/income group;
−   Expand training programmes for core investment and development skills in project
screening, appraisal, and structuring, and project supervision. Such training
programmes should strengthen the rigour of economic analysis and the appraisal of
sponsors, markets and competition. They also should increase the profitability of
equity investments, for example through greater use of quasi-equity in financial
structuring; and
−   Extend credit lines to financial intermediaries in projects in which IFC’s role is
strong and it can contribute to needed capacity building that is identified at
appraisal (OEG 2000).
On the basis of the discussion of IFC’s activities as well as recent efforts undertaken by
IFC (see section 2), our own view is that the Meltzer Report is not entirely right in its
recommendation for the merger of IFC with the WB: IFC’s semi-independent status
gives it flexibility, comparative advantage, and a distinct role regarding private sector
financing which will be lost in the case of a merger with the World Bank.
Our empirical analysis in section 3 suggests, however, that IFC’s claim regarding ‘a
focus on frontier markets’ is not fully supported by available data. Our correlation
analysis suggests that this is the case in only half of the countries included in the
sample. A focus on countries with little or no capital is confirmed, however, in the case
of the East Asia and Pacific region and Latin America. Furthermore, in view of the
Granger-causality tests employed in the previous section, there seems to be no clear
evidence regarding IFC’s role as a catalyst in the area of private sector financing. The
results are again mixed and region specific, thus leaving little room for generalization.
Finally, a positive growth effect of IFC finance was found in the case of the
Sub-Saharan region, which has not been confirmed, however, in the rest of the regions.
Nevertheless, even in view of the rather mixed results above, it would be fair to say that
IFC has played an important role in the area of private sector financing in many
developing countries and this should be continued in view of depressed capital flows,
volatility of private finance, macroeconomic instability, etc. in international capital
markets.
It is also true that until very recently, IFC’s primary focus has been on emerging
markets. Therefore, critics of IFC may be partly right in the sense that by doing so, IFC
seems to have neglected low-income countries. Furthermore, and in relation to the
previous point, IFC’s claim regarding an emphasis on high-impact sectors is debatable,
at least for the poorest of developing countries. More precisely, it could be well argued
that financial markets, infrastructure and ICT are not necessarily the most important
impact sectors in economies bedevilled with famine, conflict, epidemics, etc. as
compared, say, to substantial improvements in agriculture (an area IFC rather seems to
neglect). Having said this, however, it would be rather fair to argue that currently IFC is
moving towards the right direction (and balance) in view of its growing attention and
focus on high impact sectors in both middle and low-income countries. At the same18
time, it has been trying to assess performance by also looking at the development
impact of its projects in developing countries.
In our view, a key problem of IFC seems to be the conflict of interest between two
rather different objectives, i.e. improving its profitability (absolutely reasonable
objective for a semi-private bank like IFC) and at the same time strengthening its
developmental impact (of crucial importance if IFC wants to be identified as a
development bank with a mission ‘to promote private sector investment in developing
countries, which will reduce poverty and improve peoples' lives’ (IFC 2001a). Our own
view is that IFC should give more focus to its developmental role, trying at the same
time to operate with reasonable profits. There are a number of arguments, however,
against the above recommendation, some of them already mentioned in section 2. It has
been argued, for example, that IFC invests on a parallel basis with other financiers,
always taking a minority position, and generally only providing 20-30 per cent of the
financing needed. The returns IFC earns are tied to the returns on the project with
adjustment only for the nature of the risks for IFC’s share in the investment package
(i.e. equity vs. loan, senior loan vs. junior loan etc.). Furthermore, the returns that IFC’s
B-loan partners earn are quite explicitly tied to the returns IFC earns on its A-loans.17
Along these lines, to argue that IFC supported projects should earn a return less than
what private financiers could earn on 100 per cent private projects would be to argue
that either IFC (along with its B-loan partners) accepts a sub-par portion of the project
returns (which has not been IFC policy), or the IFC funded-projects are sub-par projects
(i.e. they do not earn a return commensurate with the risk). Neither should be the case,
however, according to IFC (Lysy 2001).
Lysy (2001) has recently argued that IFC should concentrate on areas of demonstrated
competitive advantage. It has been particularly argued that IFC’s competitive advantage
derives from its unique status as a global multilateral institution and the value of IFC’s
involvement in an investment stems from this. Along these lines, IFC needs to build the
skills that are important to the exploitation of the above competitive advantage and to
seek projects where this competitive advantage is most important.
The discussion of IFC activities and investment projects in the present paper as well as
the empirical analysis of the previous section seem also to suggest that at present, the
main recipients of IFC’s investment are mostly middle-income countries and emerging
markets. In view of that, IFC should try to re-direct its emphasis on low-income
countries with weak prospects for private sector financing rather than to emerging and
middle-income countries with better prospects and chances to attract private capital.
Overall, our view is that IFC plays a rather significant role in development financing in
many developing countries, although its role as a catalyst in private sector development
needs to be re-examined in view of the mixed findings reported in the previous section.
Moreover, there is growing evidence that the IFC is now moving to new directions and
sectors and this change of orientation will soon reveal some positive effects on the
poverty reduction front. In view of the above, we do not personally think that IFC
should be merged with the World Bank as the Meltzer Commission suggests. IFC is
different in many ways from the other Multilateral Development Banks and we do not
agree with the Meltzer Report that IFC should not retain its independence and
                                                
17 See the discussion of IFC products and services above for a definition of A-loans and B-loans.19
flexibility. Having said this, there are, however, important challenges for IFC to meet.
These include, inter alia:
−   Africa’s share in IFC’s investment commitments should be increased in view of
the severe economic difficulties, weak financial systems and the rather poor
prospects on the poverty reduction front. It is notable that in the fiscal year 2000,
80 per cent of IFC’s approvals were in targeted sectors, and 40 per cent were in
high-risk or low-income countries. However, our view is that IFC approvals in
Africa and in low-income countries should be increased in line with the mission of
IFC for poverty reduction.
−   Until very recently, the share of IFC projects related to the social sector (education,
health etc.) has been unacceptably low (about 2 per cent of the total). Although
there is a clear indication from IFC’s recent budget that the above share will
increase in the near future, it is absolutely vital that future increases are sustainable
and have the highest possible development impact.
−   Related to the previous point, IFC also needs to define its strategic approach more
clearly to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development. For a rather
large group of low-income countries, emphasis on the financial sector and
infrastructure (IFC’s so-called ‘high-impact sectors’) is not necessarily what is
needed at the moment. Financial markets, infrastructure and ICT are not
necessarily the most important impact sectors in an economy bedevilled with
famine, epidemics, etc. which, in the first instance, may have favoured measures to
improve agriculture (an area IFC seems rather not to focus on at the moment).
−   Need to reduce substantially its involvement in projects with rather ambiguous (or
even minimum) development impact, such as hotel projects in middle-income
countries and instead to re-direct its financing, expertise, efforts and products to
projects with high development impact in low-income countries (particularly in the
education and health sectors, microfinance institutions, housing, etc.).
−   As the discussion of the profitability issue seems to suggest, there is a clear need to
improve IFC’s performance evaluation criteria by placing more emphasis on the
developmental impact of projects rather their profitability outcomes.
−   Last, but not least, organizational changes—like absorbing the private sector
development department and activities of the World Bank—may be necessary if
the IFC is to perform its important role more efficiently. Needless to say, IFC’s
possible expansion also raises budget issues and adjustment of donors’ policy
towards that option.
Finally, a number of fruitful avenues of research could be opened regarding future work
in this important, though neglected, area. Obviously, the empirical analysis that was
carried out in the present study, though important, is at this stage indicative only of the
trend and the nature of IFC’s capital flows to countries/regions. At the same time, our
tentative conclusions, based on rather mixed empirical findings regarding the
relationship between IFC finance and other private capital flows, should be treated with
some degree of caution. A much more appropriate analysis for future work in this
interesting area should involve, inter alia, the development and estimation of an
allocation model for IFC capital flows (clearly beyond the scope of the present paper20
and also in view of data availability problems). Similar work on other private sector
arms of multinational development banks could also be undertaken so that useful
conclusions concerning the role of the above institutions in the area of development
financing can be drawn.
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